On November 9, 2026, an explosion and fire occurred at the HABAŞ steel plant in the Aliağa district of İzmir, Turkey, resulting in at least 17 deaths and multiple injuries. According to a company statement cited by TRT, the incident took place during scheduled maintenance of one of the electric arc furnaces. www.trthaber.com
This incident highlights the potential for chain reactions between hoisting equipment, process pipelines, and high-temperature equipment. While authorities have provided preliminary clues, the full sequence of events, root causes of equipment failure, and accountability remain under investigation.
1. Preliminary Clues
According to the provincial governor as cited by the Anadolu Agency, the incident involved a collapsed overhead crane, causing material to fall into the electric arc furnace and damaging natural gas pipelines, which triggered the explosion. This is a preliminary official statement, not a final investigative conclusion. aa.com.tr
Subsequent reports from DHA citing the Minister of Labour and Social Security indicated that falling materials during maintenance caused the rupture of natural gas and oxygen pipelines, which was related to the explosion. The failure process and responsibility are still being investigated. www.dha.com.tr
References in news reports to snapped steel cables, 120 tons of molten steel, 1800°C temperatures, and "hydrogen explosions" stem from witness accounts and should not be treated as verified investigative data or established accident mechanisms. news.tvbs.com.tw
Therefore, one cannot currently link the crane collapse, water-molten steel contact, hydrogen generation, and pipeline rupture into a proven accident chain. These clues may involve different stages and potential narrative discrepancies, requiring verification through physical evidence and formal investigation.
2. Reviewing Potential Risks from Preliminary Clues
The following analysis is based on general engineering principles and does not represent the confirmed cause of this specific case.
Loss of load control may affect surrounding process equipment
Overhead cranes and lifting equipment in steel mills are often located near furnaces, pipelines, and personnel work areas. If lifting gear, structural integrity, or the load itself is lost, the consequences can extend to other systems.
Lifting planning should assess not only load capacity but also travel paths, adjacent facilities, and personnel locations. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) identifies proper planning, personnel competence, and adequate supervision as essential requirements for safe lifting operations in the molten metal industry. www.hse.gov.uk
Damaged natural gas and oxygen pipelines involve distinct hazards
If natural gas leaks and forms a flammable mixture with air in the presence of an effective ignition source, combustion or explosion can occur.
Oxygen is not flammable, but oxygen leakage creates localized oxygen enrichment, making combustible materials easier to ignite and burn more intensely. Therefore, the hazards of oxygen and natural gas pipelines must be identified separately. www.hse.gov.uk
In this case, it is necessary to verify the location of the pipe damage, the pressure and flow rates at the time, the isolation status, and the chronological sequence of events.
Contact between molten metal and water can cause violent physical reactions
When high-temperature molten metal comes into contact with water unexpectedly, rapid vaporization and volume expansion can generate pressure waves and metal splashes, posing a risk of steam explosions. www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr
Under specific metal and reaction conditions, hydrogen-producing reactions may also occur; however, steam explosions and hydrogen combustion/explosions are different mechanisms and cannot be equated solely due to molten metal contacting water. www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr
At this stage, whether cooling water entered, whether hydrogen was produced, and the impact on this specific incident remain subjects for investigation.
3. What Safety Conditions Must Be Re-confirmed During Maintenance?
Maintenance often involves dismantling, lifting, temporary support, and overlapping tasks by multiple workers. Original equipment configurations and safety conditions under normal operation may shift.
First, is the isolation scope complete? Beyond electrical power, one must verify hazards related to gas, oxygen, pressure, gravity, and residual high heat.
Second, what equipment could be affected by a loss of load control? Could a dropped object strike pipelines, furnace shells, or other operational facilities?
Furthermore, are personnel within affected zones? Does the isolation area account for metal splashes, flames, and secondary accidents?
When lifting points, routes, sequences, or site conditions change, mechanisms for reassessment and stopping work should be in place.
HSE guidance on maintenance safety emphasizes bringing equipment to a safe state before starting, isolating energy sources and hazardous material pipelines, managing stored energy, and supporting potentially unstable components. These principles serve as a benchmark for management systems, though they do not imply that such failures were definitively present in this case. www.hse.gov.uk
4. ExTW Professional Perspective
ExTW suggests that this incident serves as a reminder that fire and explosion risk assessments must cover how hazards can cross between different systems following equipment failure.
Based on current information, key questions include: If lifting equipment malfunctions, could surrounding pipelines simultaneously be damaged? What other energy sources remain within the maintenance area? Once a failure occurs, what measures can prevent the incident from escalating?
These questions require collaboration between process, mechanical, lifting, maintenance, and safety personnel. The selection and inspection of explosion-protected (Ex) electrical equipment are also tasks requiring real-world hazard assessment.
Personnel competence building should match actual operational needs.
If work involves the installation, inspection, or maintenance of electrical equipment in explosive atmospheres, one may evaluate the IECEx Certificate of Personnel Competencies (CoPC) scheme based on job requirements. The scheme is based on work activities and units of competence; following training, individuals must pass an assessment by a certification body to obtain the certificate. www.iecex.com
Regarding lifting operations, structural safety, molten metal handling, and maintenance isolation, corresponding professional competence and management measures must be established. When planning training, companies should first inventory hazards and roles before selecting appropriate training and competence verification methods.
ExTW advocates that the value of training must be realized on-site: can personnel identify hazards, confirm isolation conditions, and make correct judgments when operational conditions change?
References
- TVBS: Report on the Turkish steel plant explosion, November 10, 2026.
- TRT Haber: Update on casualties and HABAŞ company statement, November 9, 2026.
- Anadolu Agency: Preliminary statement by the governor and information on judicial and administrative investigations, November 9, 2026.
- DHA: Official site briefing and clues regarding pipeline damage, November 9, 2026.
- UK HSE: Safety hazards in the molten metal industry.
- UK HSE: Maintenance safety for work equipment.
- UK HSE: Fire and explosion hazards from oxygen use in the workplace.
- French BARPI/ARIA: Analysis of accidents involving water and molten metal contact.
- IECEx: Frequently asked questions about the Certificate of Personnel Competencies scheme.
This article is based on public information reviewed as of November 10, 2026; the causes of the accident and determination of responsibility should rely on subsequent formal investigative results.




